We examine how patent wars affect firm strategy. We hypothesize that, as patent wars intensify, firms shift their business foci to markets with weak intellectual property (IP) protection due to increased litigation risks. This shift is attenuated for firms with stronger technological capabilities, and is more pronounced for firms whose home markets have weak IP systems. Using data from the global smartphone market, we find support for these hypotheses. Interestingly, we also find that the patent war intended to hamper the growth of the Android platform may have merely shifted the sales to weak IP countries.
INTRODUCTION
Patents and patent enforcement strategies have become an essential part of firms' competitive strategies in today's world: they use them as isolating mechanisms to protect their intellectual property or as defense mechanisms to help them obtain access to external innovations through mutual hold-up (e.g., Somaya, 2003) . For example, the smartphone industry has spent an estimated $20 billion on patent litigations and patent purchases since 2010, and the number of district court patent filings has tripled in the last 20 years (Cohan, 2012) . In 2011, for the first time, spending by Apple and Google on patent lawsuits and unusually big-dollar patent purchases exceeded their spending on research and development of new products (Duhigg and Lohr, 2012) . Hence, patent enforcement capabilities may determine market entry and exit, as well as success and failure in technology intensive industries (e.g., Helfat and Lieberman, 2002) .
While patents, and intellectual property issues in general, have been studied extensively by legal scholars and economists (e.g., Bessen and Meurer, 2008; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; Merges et al., 1997 ) 1 , only recently have strategy scholars started to pay more attention to patents as an element of firm strategy (e.g., McGahan and Silverman, 2006; Somaya, 2012) . For example, recent studies have shown that patents have deterrence effects on rivals (Agarwal, Ganco, and Ziedonis, 2009; Clarkson and Toh, 2010) , that settlements and specialized tribunals can be alternative patent enforcement strategies to costly 'litigations (Somaya, 2003; Somaya and McDaniel, 2012) , and that aggressive patenting strategies can be used to avoid being 'fenced in' by owners of complementary technologies (Ziedonis, 2004) . These recent studies have enhanced our understanding of how firms use patent enforcement strategies to cope with direct rivals.
Less attention, however, has been paid to how patent litigation activities affect market participants that are not themselves directly involved in them. This question has become increasingly important, as an increasing number of today's markets have evolved into highly interconnected networks of organizations, in which firms co-evolve around shared sets of knowledge or technologies, working both cooperatively and competitively to develop products and services (Iansiti and Levien, 2004a; Moore, 1996) . Firm strategies are often interdependent when they share such sets of technologies (Adner, 2006 (Adner, , 2012 Adner and Kapoor, 2010) . It is thus natural to expect the impact of patent litigations to propagate to interdependent market participants, even if such parties are not directly involved. Consequently, patent litigations may affect the overall performance of a broader network of firms.
Moreover, extant studies often use data from the U.S. market only. But, because patent litigation, as a value appropriation mechanism, is effective only when supported by strong institutional environments, given the increasingly global and significant levels of heterogeneity of institutional environments across different countries and businesses today, we need a better understanding of how firms react to potential patent litigations on the global scale (Somaya, 2012) .
In this paper, we investigate the effect of escalated patent litigations-the so-called 'patent war'-on firm strategy using data from the global smartphone market. We draw on the law, economics, and strategy literatures on patent enforcement (Agarwal et al., 2009; Lanjouw and Lerner, 1997; Shaver, 2012; Somaya, 2003; Somaya and McDaniel, 2012) to form testable hypotheses. Echoing some recent studies using cross-country variation in IP systems (Delgado, Kyle, and McGahan, 2013; Kyle and McGahan, 2012) , we show that the efficacy of patent enforcement systems across markets plays a significant role in firm strategy during patent wars, and ultimately shapes the global competitive landscape. In our empirical context, as the patent war intensifies, smartphone vendors 2 , even those not directly involved in patent litigations, gradually shift their business foci to markets with weaker intellectual property (IP) rights protection. This shift, however, is attenuated for vendors with stronger technological capabilities and is more pronounced for vendors whose home markets have weak IP systems. Together, these changes shape the competitive landscape for platform competition.
This paper contributes to the emerging patent enforcement strategy literature (Agarwal et al., 2009; Somaya, 2003; Somaya, 2012; Somaya and McDaniel, 2012; Ziedonis, 2004 ) that focuses on how firms leverage their patents as business assets for competitive advantage. The extant literature suggests that a firm's patent strategy does not work in vacuum, but must take local institutional environments into account, especially the effectiveness of patent enforcement systems, which is an important topic but has yet to be considered in the literature (Somaya, 2012) . Our paper is the first study to examine the relationship between the effectiveness of patent enforcement systems and firm strategies in an international context, as well as the consequence of this relationship. We investigate this relationship in an international context because the effectiveness of the patent enforcement system does not change over a short period of time but rather displays ample variation across countries. We show that patent litigations are prevalent and effective as a value appropriation strategy in markets with strong IP protections, which leads competitors to shift their business foci to markets with weak IP protection.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Patents are an exclusionary form of government-granted monopoly rights for a limited period of time, usually 20 years from the filing date (e.g., Lerner, 2002) . The patent system is predicated on the theory that inventors will be incentivized to innovate and disclose new knowledge to the public in exchange for a limited period of exclusivity in commercializing their inventions (Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998) . With globalization, and in spite of efforts such as TRIPS (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) 3 to standardize IP protection internationally, national patent systems still operate largely independently and exhibit significant differences across countries (Kyle and McGahan, 2012; Park, 2008; Somaya, 2000) . These differences include coverage, membership in international treaties, restrictions on patent rights, enforcement (e.g., availability of preliminary injunctions), and duration of protection 5 (Ginarte and Park, 1997) . Accordingly, the efficacy of patent enforcement as an appropriability mechanism varies substantially across countries. Hence, firms strategically choose to rely on patent litigations in markets with strong IP regimes, while they choose to rely on other means, such as secrecy, lead time advantages and the use of complementary marketing and manufacturing capabilities in weak IP regimes (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000; Levin et al., 1987) .
The effectiveness of patents as an appropriability mechanism varies substantially across industries as well. Traditionally, patents were relatively well-defined and effective in 'discrete' product industries, as with chemical or pharmaceutical formulas (Grabowski and Vernon, 1982; Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner, 1981) , but were quite porous, imperfect, and unclear in other industries (Cohen et al., 2000; Lemley and Shapiro, 2005) . For example, systems product industries, such as the computer industry, make products that include numerous patented inventions, which may in turn be owned by many different firms, creating a 'thicket' of patents. Thus, firms in such industries devise cooperative mechanisms, such as patent pooling (Bittlingmayer, 1988; Joshi and Nerkar, 2011; Merges, 1996) , crosslicensing (Grindley and Teece, 1997) , and even tacit truces on patent litigations between firms (Von Hippel, 1988) , to obtain access to each other's patents and thereby retain their abilities to commercialize products. While these industries have historically tended to rely more heavily on lead time, secrecy, and manufacturing or design capabilities than patents to recoup their R&D investments (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001) , in recent years, they have increasingly come to rely more on the strategic management-and enforcement-of their patents.
The recent explosion in patent enforcement litigations in these industries (Meurer and Bessen, 2005) , however, are not an entirely new phenomenon. More than a hundred years ago, in the early days of the incandescent light bulb market, which eventually replaced gas lights, patent warfare was crucial to securing Thomas Edison's control of the light-bulb market. In the first year of litigation, Edison's company was involved in nearly one hundred patent disputes (Bright, 1972; Shaver, 2012) 4 . Still earlier, 6 the 1850s witnessed the 'sewing machine war' (Lampe and Moser, 2010; Mossoff, 2011) 5 . In the spirit of Somaya (2003) , the 'strategic stakes' were high in these markets: because the expected payoff from litigating and driving out competition became greater than that of a cooperative mechanism, firms in these markets actively pursued patent enforcement litigations rather than settle or cooperate. The strategic stakes are particularly high in platform-based or standard-based markets, which often exhibit 'winner takes all' dynamics (e.g., Shapiro and Varian, 1999; Zhu and Iansiti, 2012) . Hence, despite the wide use of cross-licensing and patent pools to achieve cooperation in such industries, todays' explosion of patent enforcement litigations seems more consistent with the 'patent warfare' view suggested by Shaver (2012) 
According to this view, technology firms race to assemble patent portfolios-initially for defensive purposes in the context of a dynamic and competitive field-but then, as the industry matures, convert their shields into weapons to eliminate their competitors in pursuit of market dominance with its platform. It is important to note that such firms need not themselves innovate to develop these shields and weapons but can instead hoard them up by acquiring patents. The patent warfare view implies that patent wars, rather than cooperative outcomes, are likely to result when the technology involved in a platform or a standard is in dispute or, more generally, when the strategic stakes in a market are sufficiently high.
This view characterizes today's patent strategy dynamics as less collaborative and more destructive than traditional views (Feldman, 2012) 
On the other hand, patent enforcement is a costly competitive weapon. Direct legal and trial costs alone can run in the millions of dollars, and indirect costs can include managerial time and other resourceintensive distraction of capital and human resources (Agarwal et al., 2009; Landes and Posner, 2003) .
confined to the American shores. Foreign patents and litigations, especially in Great Britain and Germany, formed an important part of Edison's transnational litigation strategy (Bright, 1972) . 5 In recent years, there have been fights over diapers, air fresheners, oil drilling equipment, and one over heart devices that has lasted more than a decade. However, none of those received the attention that is being given to the smartphone wars. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-08/apple-phone-patent-war-like-sewing-machineminus-violence.html, accessed February 2013. 6 The patent warfare view (Shaver, 2012) resembles the board game Risk!, in which the board resembles a map of the world and competing parties assemble strategic assets, and then battle with their rivals for world domination. 7 The view by Shaver (2012) also conforms to industry practice today. '… in practice, patents are weapons. Technology companies load up on patents like Cold War nations stockpiling nuclear bombs, hoarding them for use when an important market is at stake.' Robert McMillan, 'How Apple and Microsoft Armed 4,000 Patent Warheads,' http://www.wired.com/wiredenterprise/2012/05/rockstar/, last accessed January 2013. 7 Therefore, the expected payoff of patent litigations must be sufficiently high to justify the extremely costly, disruptive, and time-consuming nature of this method of enforcement (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005; Shane and Somaya, 2007) -and the litigator needs to have a reasonable expectation that the enforcement of their patent rights will be honored in an effective, predictable and consistent manner. Thus, for a number of reasons, markets with strong IP systems have become natural 'battlegrounds' for international patent litigations. Such markets are usually member countries of international treaties, so that the legal procedures are similar across members, and litigation will be (relatively) quick and efficient, which lowers its costs. Such countries are also likely to offer 'primary' enforcement mechanisms such as preliminary injunctions, as quick and effective means of deterring imitators (Lanjouw and Lerner, 1996; Lanjouw and Lerner, 2001) . When a patent infringement litigation is successful, it is extremely costly to the infringer: the large damages or royalties can be a financial burden to the infringing firm (Bhagat, Brickley, and Coles, 1994) , in addition to potential reputation damages (Lerner, 1995) . But, more importantly, injunctions can be particularly devastating to businesses in industries characterized by rapid technological change and short product life cycles (Lanjouw and Lerner, 2001) . All told, patent enforcement strategy has become an effective competitive weapon in markets with strong IP protections.
The perceived danger of patent enforcement strategies employed by rivals can affect the strategic decisions of firms (Jaffe, 2000; Lee and Mansfield, 1996) . To avoid the cost and uncertainty associated with patent wars, firms will shift their business foci to weaker IP markets for risk management purposes.
Thus, we propose the following hypothesis:
H1: As a patent war intensifies, the share of a firm's business in weak IP markets will increase.
Intensified patent wars may have heterogeneous effects on firms with different capabilities, especially in the international context (Alcacer, Dezso, and Zhao, 2013; Shaver and Flyer, 2000) . When patents are enforced, some alleged infringers settle and agree to pay royalties, while others may both challenge the validity of the plaintiff's patent-thus potentially committing themselves to an even costlier litigation process-and countersue from the basis of their own patent portfolios. According to the patent warfare view, these firms should have strong technological capabilities, enabling them to produce large patent portfolios of their own (or obtain one as a result of patent acquisitions) and effectively lower their litigation costs (Lerner, 1995; Meurer and Bessen, 2005) . Such firms can even become aggressive litigators and initiate patent enforcements themselves. In contrast, firms lacking such technological capabilities are at a significant disadvantage, as they cannot offset their greater litigation risk by trading patents from their portfolios to achieve a more rapid resolution of their suits (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004) .
Hence, in the case of patent wars, firms with greater technological capabilities can defend themselves more effectively or even actively initiate litigations in any potential battleground, and so have less incentive to avoid such high-stakes markets with patent disputes (Jaffe, 2000) . Such firms will, therefore, be less susceptible to the effect proposed in H1. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis:
H2: The effect in H1 will be attenuated for firms with stronger technological capabilities.
The effect in H1 may also differ for firms operating against different institutional backgrounds.
This 'imprinting' is likely to carry over into their international operations and affect how they face new challenges in foreign institutional environments (Zaheer, 1995) , and so may influence their capability and willingness to engage in costly litigations (Stinchcombe, 1965) .
As Somaya and McDaniel (2012) note, in the context of patent enforcement, firms from countries with weak IP systems may develop and carry over beliefs and strategic orientations toward patents that are deeply misaligned with a strong patent environment. Due to different beliefs shaped by institutional differences between firms from countries with strong IP systems and firms from countries with weak IP systems (Barkema, Bell, and Pennings, 1996) , the two parties may be less likely to settle when a patent lawsuit is filed, thereby increasing the risk of litigation (Lanjouw and Lerner, 1997; Priest and Klein, 1984) . These belief differences may not disappear even if outside service providers familiar with host-country institutions are hired, as external advice has inherent limitations in influencing firm behaviors and learning, especially when it is impeded by deeply entrenched institutional conditioning (Somaya and McDaniel, 2012) .
Furthermore, countries with weak IP protection and ineffective enforcement systems are less frequently patent litigation battlegrounds, so firms from such countries will have less patent litigation experience (and fewer benchmark cases to refer to) than firms from strong IP environments. This experience asymmetry again puts firms from countries with weak IP protection at a disproportionate disadvantage, further increasing the risk of litigation (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004; Lerner, 1995) .
Therefore, we argue that firms from countries with weak IP systems will be more susceptible to the effect proposed in H1 due to increased risk and uncertainty:
H3: The effect in H1 will be more pronounced for firms whose home country has a weak IP system than for firms whose home country has a strong IP system.
EMPIRICAL CONTEXT: THE GLOBAL SMARTPHONE MARKET AND THE PATENT

WARS 'The smartphone industry today is characterized by a thicket of patents and wars based on those patents. Every day brings a new lawsuit or development between Apple, HTC, Microsoft, Motorola
Mobility (MMI), Nokia, and Samsung.' (Carrier, 2012) We test our hypotheses in the context of the global smartphone market, which has grown rapidly in recent years. A smartphone, as distinct from a feature phone, is a mobile phone with advanced functionalities and connectivity, incorporating such attributes as media players, compact digital cameras, video cameras, and GPS navigation. It is typically built on a mobile operating system or a platform such as Google's Android, Apple's iOS, Nokia's Symbian, and Microsoft's Windows Phone.
Although the first smartphone can be traced back to early 2001, the smartphone industry did not start to grow rapidly until Apple's release of its iPhone in 2007. The iPhone, which is based on Apple's proprietary operating system, iOS, is one of the first mobile phones to use a multi-touch interface. In the same year, Android, an open source smartphone operating system owned by Google, was unveiled along with the founding of the Open Handset Alliance: a consortium of hardware, software, and telecommunication companies devoted to advancing open standards for mobile devices. The first Android-powered phone (HTC's Dream), was released in October 2008. Since then, Google's Android platform has gained popularity and gradually taken over the market to be the most popular smartphone operating system today.
Other platforms have either declined in popularity (e.g., Blackberry, Linux, PlamOS, and Symbian) or are small niche players (e.g., WebOS, Maemo, and Bada). One exception is Microsoft's Windows Phone, the proprietary mobile operating system it developed as the successor to its Windows Mobile platform. The new platform (which is incompatible with the previous version) was released in November 2010. Although the Windows Phone's market share is still very small, Microsoft increased its sales recently, due to its partnership with Nokia, which ceased to use its own smartphone platform, Symbian, in 2011.
The developers of some smartphone platforms are also the sole hardware suppliers -for example, Apple and RIM keep their smartphone platforms closed to other vendors and build their smartphones themselves. On the other hand, other platform providers (e.g., Google, Microsoft, and Nokia) have chosen to make their platforms accessible to third-party vendors so that these vendors can build mobile devices powered by these platforms. Some vendors use only one platform for all of their smartphones, while others use multiple operating system platforms across their smartphones (e.g., Samsung simultaneously sold devices that use Android, Microsoft, Symbian, and Bada operating systems).
Although smartphone vendors started enforcing patents against rivals as early as late 2009, the industry has witnessed an explosion of patent litigations since 2011, with new patent dispute filings peaking in summer 2011. These actions involve many vendors and almost every platform provider, many of them in multiple litigations: for example, Apple has been the plaintiff or defendant in more than 100 patent lawsuits. Table 1 provides a list of high-profile patent lawsuits. 8 As it shows, they have been launched in a number of countries and not limited to the U.S. courts. Although platform providers may not target each other directly in these patent litigations, these patent litigations are often viewed as a proxy for platform competition in this industry: as the fate of a platform provider and its device vendors are linked, a platform provider can sue a device manufacturer of a competing platform to increase the cost of bringing the device to market, and thus slow down the diffusion of the competing platform.
'Insert Table 1 here' While patent disputes over hardware technology vary widely across vendors, most of the patent disputes relating to software have concerned the Android operating system, which Google distributes free of charge to vendors manufacturing and selling Android-powered smartphones 9 . Apple's former CEO, Steve Jobs, once said that he is willing to go to thermonuclear war over Android because, he claims, it is a stolen product 10 . Accordingly, Apple has been aggressively pursuing patent litigations against Android mobile phone vendors such as Samsung, HTC, and Motorola, to name a few. A series of ongoing lawsuits between Apple and Samsung regarding the design of smartphones have become one of the most publicized patent litigations in recent history.
In the meantime, these platform providers have sought to expand their patent portfolios rapidly, both to protect themselves and to attack their competitors. For example, Google purchased Motorola Mobility for US$12.5 billion in 2011, primarily to acquire the rights to over 17,000 patents owned by Motorola. In the same year, a consortium of companies, including Apple, Ericsson, Microsoft, RIM, and Sony, outbid Google in an auction of over 6,000 Nortel mobile-related telecommunications patents, at 12 US$4.5 billion. Today, industry experts constantly criticize the now out-of-control escalation of patent litigations, as they are mutually destructive and costly, resulting in a prisoners' dilemma. For example, Apple and Google have paid their lawyers more than $400 million in their patent battles over recent years (Radovsky, 2012) , and when asked about his overall feelings on patent lawsuits recently, Apple CEO, Tim Cook, said 'It's a waste, it's a time suck' (Haselton, 2012) .
The patent war in the smartphone industry offers an ideal setting in which to examine the linkage between patent litigations and the efficacy of patent systems on firm strategy. First, most smartphone vendors have sales across multiple countries which have patent systems of varying degrees of effectiveness. Given the industry characteristics of rapid technological change and short product life cycles, vendors often need to decide which countries serve as their primary markets to make most efficient use of their resources. The effectiveness of the patent systems in those countries to enforce their patent rights (via litigation if necessary) should certainly play a role in forming their strategies, and will consequently shape the industry's competitive landscape. By gathering data on vendors' operations in multiple countries over time, we can test how the patent war has influenced their business foci across those countries. Furthermore, the rapid escalation of the patent war-which started in late 2009 and intensified rapidly (as Table 1 shows)-was largely unexpected by industry participants and caught many firms off-guard. We can take advantage of this exogenous shock to examine how firms changed their behavior as the war intensifies, even if they are not directly involved in litigations.
METHODS
Data description
We construct our dataset of smartphone vendors using data from Gartner Inc. (www.gartner.com). 11 Our dataset includes the population of smartphone vendors from the first quarter (1Q) of 2008 to the fourth quarter (4Q) of 2012, a period which covers both the early stage of the global smartphone market as well as the intensified patent war among vendors. Our dataset details vendors' smartphone and smartphone platform (i.e., operating system) unit sales to users in Asia/Pacific, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Africa, Latin America, North America, Western Europe, and in selected countries within those regions for each quarter over that period. As many vendors have entered and exited the industry in various periods, we have an unbalanced panel dataset. While many of them have sales in most major countries, there is still a great deal of variation in the number of countries in which they operate and their sales levels in each country. Table 2 lists smartphone sales to end-users in different countries in 4Q2012, the last period in our dataset. It shows that the two most important markets are China and the United States, which, between them, account for more than 45percent of global smartphone sales.
'Insert Table 2 here' Table 3 provides sales information for the top 10 vendors in the same final quarter. The top 10 list comprises vendors from several countries, including South Korea, the U.S., Finland, Taiwan, Canada, Japan, and China, suggesting that competition in this industry is indeed global. Samsung and Apple are the two most significant vendors in the global market and, together, they account for more than 50 percent of total smartphone sales. 'Insert Table 3 here'
Variables
Dependent variable
To test our hypotheses, we track how many smartphone units a vendor (i) sells in a given country or region (j) in each quarter (t). We then divide this number by the total number of units the vendor sells in that quarter across all countries and regions. Thus, our dependent variable is given by:
where indicates the number of smartphone units sold by vendor i, in country j, in quarter t, and _ indicates the 'country share' in vendor i's business in quarter t (i.e., the share of vendor i's sales, in country j, in quarter t). Compared to sales measures, this measure reflects the strategic importance of a country to a vendor in a given period and is independent of the growth of the vendor's overall sales (e.g., Tanriverdı̇ and Lee, 2008) .
Because our dependent variable is continuous and constrained between 0 and 1, we follow previous studies (Hausman and Leonard, 1997; Liu et al., 1999; Loudermilk, 2007; Wagner, 2001 Wagner, , 2003 and use a fractional logit model Wooldridge, 1996, 2008) in our analysis, which uses simple quasi-likelihood estimation methods for regression models with a fractional dependent variable.
Compared with log-odds type procedures, the fractional logit model has the advantage of handling data at the extreme values of 0 and 1 Wooldridge, 1996, 2008) . The unit of analysis for testing our hypotheses is the vendor-country-quarter.
Independent variables
PatentWarIntensity. We construct a proxy measure for patent war intensity in the smartphone industry by using LexisNexis Academic to count the number of media articles related to smartphone patent litigations covered in all 'major world publications' (e.g., the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Korea Times, The Australian, and so forth) on the grounds that, as the patent war intensifies, so does the frequency of media coverage of smartphone patent litigations and the knowledge about them among vendors. We count the number of articles with both keywords 'smartphone' and 'patent' and their use in various other combinations. These articles may include information on which vendor sued which vendor in which country, major licensing and settlement announcements, and major patent acquisition announcements during our sample period.
To ensure our measure indeed captures the intensity of the patent war, we also obtain data on smartphone patent lawsuits filed in each quarter in the United States from Innography, a provider of 15 intellectual property business intelligence (www.innography.com). We then weigh each lawsuit by the average smartphone sales of its defendant and plaintiff to account for the importance of each lawsuit. We find that our measure based on media coverage is significantly correlated with the sales-weighted patent litigation count in each quarter (correlation = 0.41 and p-value = 0.07). However, the patent litigation data are available only for the U.S. market. Hence, we use media coverage as a proxy for patent war intensity in our analysis because our study looks at the global smartphone market. Figure 1 depicts our measure of patent war intensity graphically. It shows that there was a noticeable escalation of patent litigations in the later part of our study period. 12
IP_index. This variable, which measures the strength of the IP system in a given country, is based on the Intellectual Property Rights Index (IPRI), published annually since 2008 by the Property Rights
Alliance through the Hernando de Soto Fellowship Program. This index combines the methodology of Ginarte and Park (1997) 13 , which has been extensively used in prior studies (Oxley, 1999; Somaya and McDaniel, 2012; Zhao, 2006) , and an opinion-based measure of the protection of IP (World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Index), where expert participants in each country are asked to rate their nation's IP protection, scoring it from 'weak and not enforced' to 'strong and enforced.' An increase in the IP_index reflects increased IP protection in a given country. Therefore, to test H1, we expect the interaction term PatentWarIntensity * IP_index to have a negative and statistically significant effect on our dependent variable.
TechCapability. This is a vendor-specific measure of technological capability. Consistent with prior studies (Ahuja, 2000; Narin, Noma, and Perry, 1987; Song and Shin, 2008) , we use the United States Patent and Trademark Office patent database to count the number of all smartphone-related patents 14 each vendor owned at the end of 2008. Following the approach of prior studies (Ahuja, 2000; Stuart and Podolny, 1996) , we use this database for all firms, including firms headquartered outside the United States, to maintain consistency, reliability, and comparability, as patenting systems across nations differ in their applications of standards, systems for granting patents, and the value of the protections granted (Basberg, 1987; Griliches, 1990) . The United States represents one of the largest markets for smartphones, and firms commercializing their inventions would most likely patent in the United States, if they were to patent anywhere at all.
We choose to count the number of patents for each vendor at the end of 2008 for two reasons.
First, given that our sample period ends in 2012 and that a typical patent application takes approximately 3-4 years to be granted, the number of patents granted preceding our sample period reflects the vendor's technological capability free of any right-censoring concerns. Second, and more importantly, after the patent war starts in 2009, vendors may start to engage in strategic patenting behavior. Our measure is thus free from this endogeneity concern.
We then take the log of 1 plus the total patent counts to account for skewness, and test H2 by checking whether the interaction term PatentWarIntensity * TechCapability * IP_index is positive and statistically significant.
WeakOrigin. This is a vendor-specific dummy variable equal to 1 if a vendor comes from a country with weak IP protection and 0 otherwise. We locate a vendor's country of origin based on its headquarters (Zhang et al., 2010) , and use our IP_index to determine whether the home country has strong or weak IP protections: if its average IP index is below the median of all countries' average IP indices across our study period, WeakOrigin = 1, and 0 otherwise. To test H3, we examine whether the interaction term PatentWarIntensity * WeakOrigin * IP_index is negative and statistically significant.
Vendors' business foci may also be affected by many other factors. We first construct a few measures to control for demand-side drivers. One may be concerned that vendors might shift their business foci to emerging markets (which may be correlated with weak IP countries) because their income levels are rising. To control for the relative market size, we use variations in countries' shares of world GDP total (GDPshare), which is constructed using both GDP per capita and population level data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook database. Vendors may shift their business foci because of different levels of interests in smartphones across different countries. To control variations in such levels of interest, we construct a measure of smartphone-specific market share by computing a country's share of world total smartphone sales in a given quarter (CountrySalesShare).
We then construct a few measures to control for supply-side drivers. One would expect that vendors might decide on their business foci based on competitive dynamics in each country, so we count the number of vendors competing in each country in each quarter (NumFirms) and compute a countrylevel Herfindahl index (HHI) to account for market concentration (Xia, Tan, and Tan, 2008) .
To facilitate a causal interpretation, we lag both our demand-and supply-side measures by one quarter. Because some of our variables only exist in the form of annual data (e.g., GDP per capita and population), we convert all of our annual measures into quarterly measures using a linear interpolation, assuming four equal increments between years. Table 4 shows summary statistics of our variables.
'Insert Table 4 here'
RESULTS
Figure 2a
shows the share of smartphone sales in strong and weak IP countries based on whether a country's IP_index is above or below the median, and Figure 2b the trend in smartphone sales volumes in those countries. Both figures show that sales of smartphones in strong and weak IP countries were approximately 50-50 until 4Q2010, after which there are more sales in weak IP countries. While only suggestive, this trend is clearly consistent with H1.
We now turn to our regression analysis results. We include vendor fixed effects in our regression analysis to address endogeneity concerns stemming from unobserved vendor heterogeneity, and include country fixed effects to control for time-invariant country characteristics. Intertemporal trends and macroenvironmental shocks are controlled for by quarter fixed effects, which thus absorb the main effect of PatentWarIntensity. Table 5 reports our regression results. The dependent variable is each vendor's sales in a given country-quarter divided by that vendor's total sales in that quarter, _ . Model
(1) uses all vendors in our sample. The interaction term PatentWarIntensity * IP_index is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that-consistent with H1-smartphone vendors shift their business foci to weak IP countries as the patent war intensifies, all else being equal. In this case, the marginal effect of one standard deviation increase in the PatentWarIntensity computed at the mean value of all other variables leads to a reduction in the dependent variable by 0.007: given that the mean value of dependent variable is 0.051, this implies a 13.7 percent reduction in sales in a given country.
We then split the sample into vendors who were and were not involved in any patent litigations during the sample period, and repeat the analysis separately for each group. We consider a vendor to be involved in patent litigations if it was a plaintiff or defendant in any outstanding smartphone patent lawsuit during the study period. Models (2) and (3) report the results. Interestingly, we find that the interaction effect is much more pronounced and statistically significant only for those vendors not involved in patent litigations, suggesting that the shift in business foci is not driven by any direct effects of patent litigations (e.g., some vendors are banned from selling their phones during patent litigations), and also increasing our confidence for a causal interpretation, as the vendors included in Model (2) are not involved in the patent war.
In Model (4), instead of using the interaction term PatentWarIntensity * IP_index, we interact quarter dummies with the IP_index to break down the time trend and see when the shift in business foci is taking place during the sample period 15 . As it takes time for vendors to adjust their business foci, we expect the effect to show up well after the patent war emerges-and, indeed, our result shows a persistent shift only after 4Q2011. In sum, the results in Table 5 support H1. 'Insert Table 5 here' Table 6 examines the moderating effect of vendors' technological capabilities to test H2. While the inclusion of a three-way interaction term with a full sample analysis produces unbiased consistent estimates of the parameters of interest, the interpretation of a three-way interaction term may nevertheless be challenging. Hence, we first present a split-sample analysis in Models (1) and (2), based on whether a vendor has strong technological capabilities, as measured by whether its TechCapability value is above or below the median value of all vendors. The interaction term, PatentWarIntensity * IP_index, in Models (1) and (2), suggests that vendors with strong technological capabilities may not be affected by the escalation of patent litigations, while vendors with weak technological capabilities are affected and shift their business foci to weak IP countries. We then include the three-way interaction term PatentWarIntensity * TechCapability * IP_index, and repeat the analysis for all vendors, for only vendors not involved in litigations, and for only vendors involved in litigations, respectively. The results are reported in Models
(3)-(5). We find that the coefficient of the three-way interaction term is positive and statistically significant in Models (3) and (4), implying that the effect in H1 is attenuated for vendors with stronger technological capabilities. The results in Models (4) and (5) also imply that these effects apply only to those vendors that are not involved in any patent litigation. Overall, the results in Table 6 support H2. 'Insert Table 6 here'
In Table 7 , we examine the moderating effect of vendors' countries of origin. Mirroring Table 6 , we first present a split-sample analysis in Models (1) and (2), based on whether a vendor's country of origin is a weak or a strong IP country. The interaction term, PatentWarIntensity * IP_index, in Models (1) and (2), suggests that vendors from weak IP countries shift their business foci to weak IP countries as the patent war intensifies. The results from Models (3)-(5) suggest that the effect in H1 is more pronounced for vendors from countries with weak rather than strong IP systems, but that these effects apply to only those vendors that are not involved in any patent litigations.
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While WeakOrigin captures the 'imprinting' of firms by their home-country institutional environments, which may influence their capability and willingness to engage in costly litigations, one might conjecture that this measure is also strongly correlated with poor manufacturing quality: that is, vendors from weak IP countries may have poor capabilities to produce competitive smartphones, and so have to focus their business on weak IP countries. However, as long as that poor manufacturing capability stays constant, we would expect them to sell most of their products in weak IP countries all the time, so that we would not be able to detect any shift over time. However, in an unreported analysis, we investigate the time trend in vendors' changes in strategy for those from weak IP countries, mimicking Model (4) in Table 5 , by interacting quarter dummies with the IP_index. Similar to the result in Model (4) of Table 5 , we find that vendors from weak IP countries start shifting their sales to weak IP countries starting from 3Q2011 (but not before) and that this trend increases. For the alternative explanation to hold, we would have to believe that these vendors start to lose ability to make phones relative to vendors from strong IP countries from 3Q2011. In fact, we believe the opposite is more likely to be the case-that the gap in manufacturing capabilities is decreasing, as vendors from weak IP countries increasingly imitate those in strong IP countries.
'Insert Table 7 here'
Consequences of vendors' shift in business foci
In this section, we explore the consequences of vendors' strategies resulting from the escalation of the patent wars. We noted above that the intensified patent war can be seen as a proxy war for competition among smartphone platforms, and, (in particular) represented intensive attacks by 'closed' systems (such as Apple's iOS, Microsoft Windows Phone, and Blackberry) on Google's 'open' Android system. As
Android was the center of most attacks, we expect vendors to shift their sales of Android-powered smartphones toward weak IP countries. Consequently, we expect the market share of Android operating system to grow more in weak IP countries than they do in strong IP countries.
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To test these predictions, we track which operating system has been used in the smartphones that vendor i sells in country j in quarter t. We compute two measures. At the vendor level, we divide the number of Android-based smartphone units sold by the vendor in a given country or region by the total number of units the vendor sells in the same quarter across all countries and regions. The measure reflects the importance of the Android system to each vendor's business in each country. At the country level, we compute each operating system's market share in each country for each quarter. Table 8 reports regression results. In Models (1)-(3), we use the vendor-level Android share as the dependent variable. We include the same set of independent variables as in Table 5 . We include all vendors in Model (1), and then look at vendors involved and not involved in patent litigations separately in Models (2) and (3). The interaction term, PatentWarIntensity * IP_index, is negative and statistically significant in all three models. The result shows that there is a significant shift in vendors' Android shares toward weak IP countries, and this shift is greater for vendors not involved in patent litigations.
In Model (4) of Table 8 , we investigate the shift in the market share of Android smartphones at the country level. The dependent variable is the Android's market share in a given country. We include the lag of Android's market share to control for the interest level of Android devices in each country and the lag of GDPshare to control for relative market size. We find that, consistent with the shift at the vendor level, Android market share grows faster in weak IP countries than in strong IP countries as the patent war intensifies. Interestingly, this result suggests that the patent war intended to hamper the proliferation of Android phones may have merely shifted the sales of Android phones to weak IP countries. Consequently, the Android system has flourished in weak IP countries.
'Insert Table 8 here'
Robustness checks
In our empirical analysis, we treat the sudden escalation of the patent war as an exogenous shock to smartphone vendors, especially those not directly involved in patent litigations, and argue that the observed shift in vendors' business foci toward weak IP countries over time is caused by the intensified patent war. The environment, however, is a complex one: many other changes may have caused the shift during this time period. To establish our causal interpretation, we have included a number of controls in our analysis. For example, we take advantage of our panel data structure to control for vendor-specific, country-specific and time-specific fixed effects. We also explicitly control for many demand-side and supply-side drivers (e.g., the demand for smartphones and competition among smartphone vendors in different countries) that may change over time and affect vendors' strategic decisions. Our analysis (Model 4 of Table 5 ) also reveals that the shift of business foci coincides with the escalation of the patent war and is persistent over time. Finally, our results on the moderating effects of vendors' technological capabilities and their origins provide further evidence that patent systems play a role in vendors' strategies. In this section, we discuss several robustness checks that provide additional support for our causal interpretation.
Following previous studies (Tanriverdı̇ and Lee, 2008) , our analysis uses vendors' sales shares in different countries to measure their business foci. As business foci can be measured in many different ways, we use new product introductions as an alternative measure, and test whether our results hold with this new measure as a robustness check. We expect vendors to introduce more new smartphones in countries or regions that are important to their businesses, whereas, if they avoid markets with strong IP markets because of increased litigation risk, then we can expect them to also minimize their exposure to such risk by being selective and minimizing the number of product models released. A recent study by Toh and Kim (2012) echoes such firm strategy in the context of technological uncertainty and a firm's technological specialization, and shows that a firm's technological specialization increases as it faces highly litigious rivals. For this analysis, we use alternative data sources-GfK and GSMArena.com-and an alternative dependent variable, the number of smartphone models released in each country. GfK (www.gfk.com) is one of the world's leading market research companies based in Germany: for each country, our GfK data include vendor name, product name, product ID number, product's earliest marketing date (month & year), and its non-subsidized price for each quarter. GSMArena.com (www.gsmarena.com) provides information to consumers-including vendor name, product name, product release date, and other technical product features-to help them choose a mobile device. We scrape data from this source using a web crawler, and then use it to cross-check with our GfK data and fill in missing data, to form our final dataset for the robustness check analysis.
'Insert Table 9 here' Table 9 reports the results. We use negative binomial models, because our dependent variable is a count variable, and find that, as predicted, vendors launch a smaller number of product models in strong IP countries as the patent war intensifies, and that this effect is more pronounced for vendors not involved in patent litigations.
We are also concerned that our results might be driven by systematic changes in vendors' pricing strategies across countries. As a robustness check, using data from GfK and GSMArena.com, we compute the average price level of a vendor's smartphone in a given country and quarter. In unreported fixedeffects panel regressions, we repeat the analysis in Table 5 after replacing our dependent variable with the price level (in logarithm), but find no evidence of shifts in pricing strategies as the patent war intensifies.
Our third concern is that vendors' shift toward weak IP countries might be driven by the deployment of infrastructures to support smartphone technologies (e.g., 3G/4G technology) in those countries in recent years, although this explanation does not explain the systematic differences between vendors with different levels of technological capabilities. Nevertheless, we conduct a robustness check by restricting countries to those which already had infrastructures that supported smartphones at the beginning of our sample period, which we identified by whether it registered smartphone sales in 1Q2008, i.e., Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Spain, U.K., and the U.S.
Repeating the analyses only with this set of countries, we find similar results (unreported).
Finally, we are concerned that our results might be driven by a small number of countries that have experienced tremendous growth in their smartphone sales. We compute the average growth rate of smartphone sales across all quarters in our dataset for each country/region. The growth rates of two countries, India and China, are two standard deviations above the mean growth rate of all countries. In unreported regressions, we repeat the analysis after dropping these two countries from our dataset. Our results are qualitatively unchanged.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper views firms' patents as a competitive weapon and shows how patent litigations affect market participants in the global market for smartphones. In recent years, patent strategy and its enforcement are becoming increasingly important for value appropriation by innovators, similar to marketing and pricing (Teece, 1986) , and strategy scholars can benefit from a better understanding of patent enforcement strategies and their consequences.
This study sheds new light on firms' patent enforcement strategies by highlighting the significance of heterogeneity in the effectiveness of patent systems for global competition. Firms use markets with strong IP protection as a natural battleground for their patent enforcement strategies, which leads to increased litigation risk for other participants in those markets. Consistent with our theoretical argument, we find that, as the patent war intensifies, firms focus their businesses more on markets with weak IP protection than on those with strong IP protection, even when they are not involved in patent litigation themselves. This effect is more pronounced for firms with weak technological capabilities, and firms that come from countries with weak IP systems. The main driver of our theoretical argument, and the main focus of our empirical analyses, is the disproportionate increase in litigation risk in strong relative to weak IP countries. Our results show that vendors that are more confident in their litigation capability are less susceptible to the increased litigation risk.
Our study contributes to the emerging patent enforcement strategy literature (Agarwal et al., 2009; Clarkson and Toh, 2010; Polidoro and Toh, 2011; Somaya, 2003; Somaya, 2012; Somaya and McDaniel, 2012; Ziedonis, 2004 ) that focuses on how firms leverage their patents as business assets for competitive advantage. We argue that firms race to assemble patent portfolios as defenses, and eventually convert their shields into weapons which they wield to attempt to eliminate their competition in their pursuit of market dominance. This study also contributes to the business ecosystem literature (Adner, 2006 (Adner, , 2012 Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Levien, 2004a, 2004b; Moore, 1996; Zhu and Iansiti, 2012) . The smartphone industry is a classic example of a business ecosystem, as participants in this industry are highly interconnected (Iansiti and Levien, 2004a; Moore, 1996) -and this interconnectivity means that effects on some ecosystem participants are likely to extend to affect the rest. In our setting, the deterrence effect of the patent war affects vendors not directly involved in patent litigations, as well as influencing the market shares of different smartphone platforms.
Our study offers some practical managerial implications. First, our findings suggest that rivals in global industries may not be deterred from competing in high-stake markets by patent enforcementinstead they may simply shift their business foci to markets with weak IP systems where such enforcement is ineffective. In our setting, some smartphone vendors-such as Apple-launch a series of intensified patent litigations with the intention of gaining competitive advantage in specific markets, only to find themselves competitively disadvantaged in the global platform war. Hence, it may not always be in a firm's best interest to deter imitation using patent litigations (Polidoro and Toh, 2011) . While currently pending patent litigations may be years away from a conclusive outcome, it seems likely that a strong Android ecosystem has emerged in the majority of the world, partly because of heterogeneity in the efficacy of different IP systems, and partly because Android, as an 'open' software system, is available to vendors free of charge. Hence, managers need to be mindful of the broader consequences of using patent litigations as a deterrence mechanism when competing on a global scale in heterogeneous markets.
Second, digital convergence implies that many future technological innovations will grow increasingly complex and are likely to rely on many patents. Our results highlight the importance of holding valuable patents as a defense mechanism: competitors who do not have patents with which to countersue are likely to be forced to shift their business foci, even if they are not directly involved in litigations. Because the fates of participants in one ecosystem are interlinked, competition between platform providers can take the form of indirect wars between any two participants from different ecosystems. Thus, in addition to paying close attention to direct competitors within the same ecosystem (e.g., Samsung vs. HTC within the Android ecosystem), participants need to be cognizant of potential threats from different ecosystems (e.g., Nokia in the Windows Phone ecosystem vs. Samsung in the Android ecosystem).
This study naturally has several limitations. First, the range of participants in the smartphone industry is not limited to mobile device manufacturers and platform providers-other business ecosystem participants (such as telecommunication operators and application developers) may also need to respond strategically to patent wars. As the patent war is waged among device makers and platform providers, we believe that our results provide the first-order effects. Future research may gather additional data to explore the impact of the patent war on other types of industry participants.
Second, the theoretical argument introduced here may hinge on whether the product in question involves a patent thicket and is subject to a patent war, so the generalizability of our theory should be taken with caution. Future studies can explore other industry settings to extend our findings.
Finally, the worldwide smartphone market is still growing, and its dynamics are yet to play out in full. Despite these limitations, we believe this study enhances our understanding of patents, patent enforcement strategies, and the dynamics of patent wars in platform competition, and significantly contributes to the emerging patent enforcement strategy literature. (2) and (3) split the sample by whether a vendor was involved in a patent litigation or not, and Model (4) uses quarter-IP index interaction terms to dissect the time trend and test which periods are affecting vendors' firm strategy. Fractional logit models are used in all models. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the vendor level in parentheses. Standard errors are omitted for the interactions between quarters and IP_index in Model (4) for brevity. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (4) and (5) split the sample by whether a vendor was involved in a patent litigation or not and replicates the analysis in Model (3). Fractional logit models are used in all models. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the vendor level in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 2,920 Notes: The dependent variable is each vendor's sale in a given country-quarter divided by the vendor's total sales in that quarter. Models (1) and (2) use a split-sample analysis that parallels Model (3). Model (3) uses a three-way interaction term to test how vendors whose home country has a weak IP system are affected as the patent war intensifies. Model (4) and (5) split the sample by whether a vendor was involved in a patent litigation or not and replicates the analysis in Model (3). Fractional logit models are used in all models. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the vendor level in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Table 8 . The impact of the patent war on Android market share Notes: In Models (1)-(3), the dependent variable is each vendor's sale of Android devices in a given country-quarter divided by the vendor's total sales in that quarter. In Model (4), the dependent variable is the market share of Android-powered smartphones in a given country. Fractional logit models are used in all models. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are clustered at the vendor level for Models (1)-(3) and at the country level for Model (4). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Vendor Level
Country Level (1) All Vendors
(2) Not in litigation
(3) Involved in litigation (4) Android market share PatentWarIntensity * IP_index -0.0010*** -0.0012*** -0.0009*** -0.0015*** (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) IP_index 1.8511*** 1.8404** 1.7309*** 0.0320 (0 Table 9 . Shift of vendors' product launch strategies Notes: The dependent variable is the number of product models released in a given country. Negative binomial models are used in all models. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors clustered at the vendor level in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
